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INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE1 
 Amici are law professors and scholars of children 
and the law, family law, equal protection law, and anti-
discrimination law. Professor Cary M. Shelby is a for-
mer foster youth. Amici submit this brief to: (1) demon-
strate that allowing a government contractor 
providing public foster care services a categorical ex-
emption—unrelated to children’s needs and same-sex 
foster parents’ fitness—harms children in the State’s 
care; and (2) explain that allowing agencies to discrim-
inate based on a conviction that only men and women 
can marry would give legal effect to a private religious 
belief, at the expense of foster children and contrary to 
Fourteenth Amendment values. Neither the majority 
nor “some fraction of the body politic” should be per-
mitted to “use the power of the State to enforce [its pri-
vate] views on the whole of society through operation 
of [law].”2 Amici’s analysis advances the primacy of 
 
 1 This brief was not authored, in whole or in part, by counsel 
for either party, and no person other than amici and their aca-
demic institutions contributed monetarily to the preparation or 
submission of this brief. This amicus brief is filed pursuant to a 
letter of consent from Petitioners and Intervenors. Respondents 
filed blanket consents on the docket. 
 2 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003) (explaining 
that the condemnation of same-sex sexual relations “has been 
shaped by religious beliefs, conceptions of rights and acceptable 
behavior, and respect for the traditional family,” however, “[t]he 
issue is whether the majority may use the power of the State to 
enforce these views on the whole of society through operation of 
the criminal law.”); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 
U.S. 432, 448 (1985) (“[T]he City may not avoid the strictures of 
[the Equal Protection] Clause by deferring to the wishes or objec-
tions of some fraction of the body politic. ‘Private biases may be  
2 
 
children’s rights and interests to highlight that carv-
ing out a religious exemption to an anti-discrimination 
mandate forces the State to breach its highest duty to 
protect children in its care and offends the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
--------------------------------- ♦ --------------------------------- 
 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
There can be no keener revelation of a society’s soul 
than the way in which it treats its children.3 
 The framing of this dispute has centered on the 
religious rights of a government contractor to exclude 
married same-sex couples from providing foster homes 
in violation of the City’s contractual anti-discrimina-
tion law. Minimized in the analysis are thousands of 
children in foster care who may be directly and ad-
versely impacted if Catholic Social Services’ (CSS) pri-
vate belief in the provision of foster care services is 
given legal effect. It is the children whose placement 
options that may be curtailed and their interests that 
amici center in the constitutional calculus.4 
 
outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indi-
rectly, give them effect.’ ”) (citing Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 
433 (1984)). 
 3 President Nelson Mandela, Address at the Launch of the 
Nelson Mandela Children’s Fund, AFR. NAT’L CONG. (May 8, 
1995), http://www.mandela.gov.za/mandela_speeches/1995/950508_ 
nmcf.htm. 
 4 We believe that the best solution for children is to remain 
or be reunified with their families of origin when possible. 
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 Amici advance two arguments. First, a categorical 
exemption, based on religious beliefs rather than fos-
ter children’s needs, does not serve the best interests 
of children and violates the State’s duty to foster chil-
dren. Such an exemption needlessly restricts the pool 
of prospective foster parents, exacerbating child-wel-
fare realities that increase the risk of a greater number 
of children being confined to long-term, institutional 
care. The reduction of same-sex foster parents would 
also have a disproportionate impact on “special needs”5 
and LGBT children in foster care.6 
 Second, allowing a government contractor to ex-
clude same-sex foster parents gives legal effect to pri-
vate beliefs in the provision of public foster care 
services in contravention of the aims of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The requested exemption is not inert; it 
is one that gives legal effect to unconstitutionally im-
permissible forms of discrimination on the basis of sex 
and sexual orientation. This Court’s equality and lib-
erty jurisprudence eschews gender stereotyping about 
the role of men and women in parenting, maintains a 
strong presumption against sex discrimination, and 
 
 5 55 Pa. Code §§ 3140.201–3140.210 (2020); Pennsylvania 
State Adoption Assistance Program, N. AM. COUNCIL ON ADOPTA-
BLE CHILD. (Sept. 2019), https://www.nacac.org/help/adoption- 
assistance/adoption-assistance-us/state-programs/pennsylvania- 
adoption-assistance-program/ (an itemized list of children 
deemed “special needs”). 
 6 Child Welfare, YOUTH.GOV, https://youth.gov/youth-topics/ 
lgbtq-youth/child-welfare (last visited July 10, 2020). 
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rejects state action that singles out or excludes LGBT 
people.7 
--------------------------------- ♦ --------------------------------- 
 
ARGUMENT 
 CSS is a government contractor providing public 
foster care services for the City of Philadelphia. Like 
all contractors performing this critical government ser-
vice, CSS must adhere to generally applicable nondis-
crimination requirements. The City includes a 
provision in all foster care contracts that requires con-
tractors to comply with the Fair Practices Ordinance 
(FPO). This ordinance prohibits discrimination in 
“public accommodations” on the basis of race, religion, 
sexual orientation, gender identity, and marital status, 
to name a few.8 Yet, CSS seeks a religious exemption to 
the prohibition on sexual orientation discrimination 
because of its religious belief that marriage can only  
be between a man and a woman.9 In other words,  
 
 7 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996) (The flaw of a 
blanket exemption to state anti-discrimination law is akin to one 
of this Court’s objections to Amendment 2: “It is at once too nar-
row and too broad. It identifies persons by a single trait and then 
denies them protection across the board.”). 
 8 Phila. Code § 9-1106 (2016). 
 9 Brief for Petitioner at 8–9, Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 
140 S. Ct. 1104 (2020) (No. 19-123) (“Home study certifications 
signify an agency’s approval of a family, and CSS understands the 
home studies as an endorsement of the relationships of those liv-
ing in the home. Accordingly, CSS cannot certify relationships 




CSS seeks to categorically refuse to certify qualified 
same-sex couples as foster parents and to continue re-
ceiving government funding while doing so.10 
 Often, rights-based disputes center on adults’ in-
terests; however, critical to the Court’s analysis is the 
fact that children are at the heart of this legal contro-
versy.11 As amici highlighted in their amicus brief in 
Obergefell v. Hodges, which the Court cited, children’s 
interests must be weighed in the constitutional analy-
sis.12 This Court has acknowledged, “the protection 
that foster children have is simply the requirement of 
state law that decisions about their placement be de-
termined in the light of their best interests.”13 The City 
would breach its duty to foster children in its care by 
allowing a government contractor to exclude families 
based on private beliefs that contravene both chil-
dren’s best interests and Fourteenth Amendment prin-
ciples. This breach is particularly acute for “special 
needs”14 children who face unique placement 
 
 10 Id. at 9 (“In practice, this means that CSS cannot provide 
foster care certifications for unmarried couples, regardless of sex-
ual orientation, nor for same-sex married couples.”). 
 11 Catherine Smith, Obergefell’s Missed Opportunity, 79 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 223, 223 (2016) (“[C]hildren’s legal interests 
are usually sidelined by an unyielding obsession with the inter-
ests of adults in our society.”). 
 12 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2600 (2015) (citing 
Brief of Scholars of the Constitutional Rights of Children as Amici 
Curiae 22-27). 
 13 Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 
U.S. 816, 860 (1977) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 14 Tanya M. Washington, Throwing Black Babies Out With 
the Bathwater: A Child-Centered Challenge to Same-Sex Adoption  
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challenges and for LGBT children who have been 
forced from their homes because their families reject 
their sexual orientation or gender identity, often on re-
ligious grounds.15 
 
I. ALLOWING A GOVERNMENT CONTRAC-
TOR TO CATEGORICALLY EXCLUDE 
SAME-SEX FOSTER PARENTS FAILS TO 
SERVE THE BEST INTERESTS OF CHIL-
DREN 
 “[W]hen the state places a child in state-regulated 
foster care, the state has entered into a special rela-
tionship with that child which imposes upon it certain 
affirmative duties.”16 These obligations center on the 
needs and interests of minor children to whom the 
State owes “a duty of the highest order.”17 The proper 
 
Bans, 6 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L. J. 1, 1 (2008) (“ ‘[S]pecial 
needs’ children . . . includes children with medical and develop-
mental disabilities, older children, and sibling sets wh[o] are more 
difficult to place. . . .”). 
 15 Approximately 26 percent of LGBT youth were forced from 
their homes because of conflicts with their families of origin re-
garding their sexual orientation or gender identity. Child Welfare, 
YOUTH.GOV, https://youth.gov/youth-topics/lgbtq-youth/child-welfare  
(last visited July 10, 2020). 
 16 Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 808 (3d Cir. 2000); see also 
D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Tech. Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 
1372 (3d Cir. 1992) (en banc) (“A relationship between the state 
and foster children arises out of the state’s affirmative act in find-
ing the children and placing them with state-approved families. 
By so doing, the state assumes an important continuing, if not 
immediate, responsibility for the child’s well-being.”). 
 17 Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984). 
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exercise of the State’s commitment to children within 
its care and custody is defined by the best interests of 
the child standard.18 In the foster care context, the best 
interests of children are served by the placement op-
tion that provides the most permanence, stability, and 
security.19 
 The State has a duty to take actions that facilitate, 
rather than foreclose, placement in the optimal set-
ting.20 Providing foster care services is delegable, and 
the duty owed to foster children remains. This dele-
gated duty must be performed in service of children’s 
best interests. 
 Whether the City or its contracted agent is as-
sessing the eligibility of prospective foster parents, de-
terminations must be informed by objective factors 
related to children’s needs and parental fitness. Con-
tractors who choose to provide foster care services do 
not have the authority to act in ways that harm 
 
 18 In re Sweeney, 574 A.2d 690, 691 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (not-
ing, “issues of custody and continuation of foster care are deter-
mined according to a [foster] child’s best interests”); Lindley v. 
Sullivan, 889 F.2d 124, 128–32 (7th Cir. 1989). 
 19 Pennsylvania and federal child welfare law identify chil-
dren’s best interests as being served by the most beneficial place-
ment option. See The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 671(a)(15), 673(b)(d), 675(5)(E) (2018); 11 PA. STAT. AND 
CONST. STAT. ANN. § 2633 (West 2020); D.P. v. G.J.P., 146 A.3d 
204, 211 (Pa. 2016) (observing the state’s “compelling interest in 
safeguarding children . . . and promoting their wellbeing”). 
 20 Once a child is within the care and custody of the State, 
and it is acting “[a]s parens patriae, the State’s goal is to provide 
the child with a permanent home.” Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 
745, 766 (1982). 
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children, even if their actions are grounded in privately 
held religious beliefs. Excluding same-sex foster par-
ents based on categorical considerations unrelated to 
merit or fitness contravenes children’s best interests 
and breaches the government’s duty to act in further-
ance of those entrusted to its care. In the foster care 
context, children’s best interests are served by access 
to familial settings.21 
 
A. Children’s Best Interests are Better 
Served By Placement with Foster Fami-
lies Than in Institutional Care Settings 
 Placement with foster families, including LGBT 
foster families, is generally more beneficial to children 
than placement in long-term institutional care in con-
gregate care homes and furthers, rather than frus-
trates, children’s best interests.22 There is a 
 
 21 Encouraging Adoption: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Human Res. of the Comm. on Ways and Means, 105th Cong. 112 
(1997) (statement of Fred H. Wulczyn, Ph.D., University of Chi-
cago) (“Permanency has a variety of connotations including the 
notion of stability with respect to the home where a child lives 
and his or her relationship to their caregivers.”). 
 22 “[Foster care] youths, lacking permanent families to help 
them transition into adulthood, are at heightened risk of negative 
outcomes: emotional adjustment problems, poor educational re-
sults and employment prospects, and inadequate housing and 
homelessness; furthermore, they are more likely to become in-
volved with the criminal justice system.” EVAN B. DONALDSON 
ADOPTION INST., EXPANDING RESOURCES FOR WAITING 
CHILDREN II: ELIMINATING LEGAL AND PRACTICE BAR-
RIERS TO GAY AND LESBIAN ADOPTION FROM FOSTER 
CARE 11 (2008). 
9 
 
substantial and growing body of evidence documenting 
the harms of extended institutional care, including 
poverty, homelessness, housing insecurity, increased 
rates of substance abuse, unemployment, incarcera-
tion, poor academic performance, low graduation rates, 
and early parenthood.23 Conversely, exclusion of LGBT 
parents from fostering finds no support in the body of 
credible social science research on outcomes for chil-
dren in LGBT families.24 
 
 23 Gary J. Gates et al., Williams Inst., Adoption and Foster 
Care by Gay and Lesbian Parents in the United States 4, 17–18 
(2007). 
 24 Mary L. Bonauto, Civil Marriage as a Locus of Civil Rights 
Struggles, 30 HUM. RTS. 3, 7 (2003) (noting that “thirty-five years 
of studies showing that children of gay and lesbian parents are 
normal and healthy on every measure of child development”). 
“[R]esearch has challenged the stereotype of gays and lesbians as 
individuals who lack the ability, relationship stability and/or 
moral values to adequately raise children. Reviews of nearly a 
quarter-century of research on parenting by non-heterosexual 
adults is extraordinarily consistent in indicating that they are 
just as competent and well-adjusted as their heterosexual coun-
terparts and that the children in their households show no mean-
ingful differences in psychological adjustment from those who 
grow up with straight parents. . . .” DAVID M. BRODZINSKY & 
EVAN B. DONALDSON ADOPTION INST., EXPANDING RE-
SOURCES FOR CHILDREN III: RESEARCH-BASED BEST 
PRACTICES IN ADOPTION BY GAYS AND LESBIANS 13 
(2011), https://library.childwelfare.gov/cwig/ws/library/docs/gate-
way/Blob/52535.pdf ?r=1&rpp=10&upp=0&w=+NATIVE%28%27 
recno%3D52535%27%29&m=1; see also Nanette Gartrell et al., 
Adolescents with Lesbian Mothers Describe Their Own Lives, 59 
J. OF HOMOSEXUALITY 1211, 1212–22 (2012) (The researchers con-
ducted a longitudinal study over three decades of children of les-
bian parents and reported positive outcomes for children.). 
10 
 
 This Court acknowledged the parental fitness of 
same-sex couples in Obergefell v. Hodges, observing: 
Most States have allowed gays and lesbians to 
adopt, either as individuals or as couples, and 
many adopted and foster children have same-
sex parents. This provides powerful confirma-
tion from the law itself that gays and lesbians 
can create loving, supportive families.25 
Placement with foster families is more beneficial to 
children than long-term institutional settings, and 
LGBT families are available to provide foster homes. 
 
B. A Government Contractor’s Categorical 
Exclusion Diminishes Access to Familial 
Placements, Harming All Children in 
Foster Care and Disproportionately Im-
pacting “Special Needs” and LGBT Chil-
dren 
 Allowing discrimination that excludes same-sex 
foster parents based solely on their sexual orientation 
harms all foster children and imposes an even harsher 
consequence on “special needs” and LGBT children in 
the State’s care. 
 Child welfare realities across the nation reflect a 
surplus of waiting children and a deficit of prospective 
parents.26 The number of children in the child welfare 
 
 25 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600 (citing Brief for Gary J. Gates 
as Amicus Curiae 4–5). 
 26 Children’s Bureau, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
Child Welfare Outcomes 2016 Report to Congress (2016),  
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system is increasing, while there has been no corre-
sponding increase in the numbers of available foster 
families.27 According to a study from 2014 to 2016, 
same-sex couples raising children were seven times 
more likely to foster children and to adopt children 
than their different-sex counterparts.28 LGBT foster 
families are increasingly filling an important need in 
the foster care system. Excluding them from the pool 
of prospective parents will mean more foster children 




Children’s Bureau, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Trends 
in Foster Care and Adoption: FY 2009–FY 2018, at 1 (2019), 
https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/trends_fostercare_ 
adoption_09thru18.pdf. 
 27 John Kelly, Projection: National Foster Care Numbers 
Continue to Rise in 2017 IMPRINT, (Nov. 2, 2017), https://chronicle 
ofsocialchange.org/youth-services-insider/projection-national-foster- 
care-numbers-will-continue-rise; Children’s Bureau, U.S. Dep’t of 
Health & Human Servs, The AFCARS Report: Preliminary FY 
2016 Estimates as of Oct 20, 2017–No. 24 (2017), https://www. 
acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/afcarsreport24.pdf; U.S. Admin-
istration for Children and Families Children’s Bureau, The 
AFCARS Report: Preliminary FY 2017 Estimates as of August 10, 
2018–No. 25 (2019), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/ 
afcarsreport25.pdf [hereinafter The AFCARS Report: Preliminary 
FY 2017 Estimates]. 
 28 Shoshana K. Goldberg & Kerith J. Conron, How Many 
Same-Sex Couples in the U.S. are Raising Children, WILLIAMS 
INST. 1 (July 2018), https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp- 
content/uploads/Same-Sex-Parents-Jul-2018.pdf. 
 29 BRODZINSKY, supra note 24, at 3 (“[S]ocietal stigmas re-
lating to adoption by lesbians and gay men remain, as do institu-
tional barriers. These impediments do not further the best  
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1. A Categorical Exclusion Harms All 
Foster Children 
 A government contractor using its delegated au-
thority to exclude same-sex couples would likely ex-
pose more foster children to the documented harms of 
long-term confinement in state institutions and group 
homes.30 Categorical exclusions of same-sex foster par-
ents would shrink the already insufficient pool of avail-
able prospective foster parents.31 The net effect of 
allowing an exemption from the City’s non-discrimina-
tion requirement would be frustration of the City’s 
ability to provide the most beneficial placement option 
for the greatest number of foster children.32 More fos-
ter children would likely experience negative outcomes 
in contravention of their best interests.33 The 
 
interests of children; indeed, they prevent or delay permanency 
for many, undermining their long-term psychosocial and aca-
demic adjustment. With over 100,000 children continuing to lin-
ger in foster care . . . every effort must be made to find timely and 
permanent placements for them. . . .”). 
 30 Pennsylvania State Adoption Assistance Program, supra 
note 5. 
 31 Id. at 6 (“[B]anning or hindering lesbians and gay adults 
from fostering or adopting will reduce the number of permanent 
and nurturing homes for children in need.”). 
 32 “[S]ome children will not be adopted at all. Such children 
may have to live in state foster institutions.” Mark Strasser, Leg-
islative Presumptions and Judicial Assumptions: On Parenting, 
Adoption and the Best Interests of the Child, 45 KAN. L. REV. 49, 
76 (1996). 
 33 Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Waiting for Loving: The 
Child’s Fundamental Right to Adoption, 34 CAP. U. L. REV. 297, 
326 (2005) (“In the face of a shortage of adoptive parents, categor-
ical bans actually ensure that some children will never have a  
13 
 
exemption CSS is seeking would frustrate, rather than 
facilitate, the best placement option for foster children 
and breach the government’s fiduciary duty to this vul-
nerable population. 
 
2. A Categorical Exclusion Dispropor-
tionately Impacts “Special Needs” 
Foster Youth 
 “Special needs” children are defined under Penn-
sylvania law to include: 
• children ages 5 to 18; 
• racial or ethnic minority youth;34 
• sibling groups; 
 
family of their own. . . . Many of these children will wait in vain 
and will ‘age out’ of the system into homelessness and jobless-
ness.”). 
 34 Half of the children under eighteen who live with same-sex 
couples are children of color. Gary J. Gates, Williams Inst., LGBT 
Parenting in the United States 1 (2013), https://willamsinstitute. 
law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/LGBT-Parenting.pdf; see also 
Washington, supra note 14, at 2 (“For many Black orphans the 
choice is not between placement with a heterosexual parent or a 
gay or lesbian parent; rather, it is between placement and non-
placement.”); DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR 
OF CHILD WELFARE 149 (2002). LGBT foster youth of color are 
suffering at the intersection of race and LGBT identity. Kerith J. 
Conron & Bianca D.M. Wilson, Williams Inst., LGBT Youth of 
Color Impacted by the Child Welfare and Juvenile Justice Sys-





• children with physical, mental, emotional 
conditions or disabilities; and 
• children with a genetic condition that in-
dicates a high risk of developing a disease 
or disability.35 
 “Special needs” children, who are more likely to be 
fostered by same-sex couples, tend to have few family 
placement options available to them and are particu-
larly vulnerable to experiencing the harms of institu-
tional care and the risk of aging out of the foster care 
system.36 
 Same-sex couples are not only seven times more 
likely to foster and adopt, they are also “more likely to 
adopt older children and children with special needs, 
who are statistically less likely to be adopted.”37 Allow-
ing religious entities to refuse to certify same-sex cou-
ples would therefore decrease the number of available 
families for children. Categorically excluding same-sex 
foster parents is likely to substantially and adversely 
impact the foster care system and the most vulnerable 
children it serves. 
 
 35 Pennsylvania State Adoption Assistance Program, supra 
note 5. 
 36 “Special needs children . . . suffer disproportionately from 
categorical barriers to adoption. Remember, special needs chil-
dren include not only disabled and older children, but also chil-
dren of color. [They] are the ‘toughest children to place in adoptive 
homes’ and they ‘often wait the longest before being adopted.’ ” 
Woodhouse, supra note 33, at 327. 
 37 The AFCARS Report: Preliminary FY 2017 Estimates, su-
pra note 27; see also BRODZINSKY, supra note 24, at 33–34. 
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3. A Categorical Exclusion Dispropor-
tionately Harms and Stigmatizes 
LGBT Foster Youth 
 LGBT children will also be detrimentally and dis-
proportionately impacted by the exclusion of LGBT 
families by contracted foster care agencies. Because 
LGBT youth, like “special needs” foster children, have 
unique needs and present unique placement chal-
lenges, it is more likely they will age out of the foster 
care system and suffer harmful outcomes. 
 LGBT youth are overrepresented in the foster care 
system, comprising a staggering 19 to 34 percent of fos-
ter children.38 They are also more likely to experience 
multiple placements and to be placed in congregate 
care.39 Seventy percent of LGBT youth report experi-
encing physical violence while in congregate care.40 
LGBT youth continue to experience negative effects of 
foster care even after exiting the system.41 These 
 
 38 LGBTQ YOUTH IN THE FOSTER CARE SYSTEM, Human 
Rights Campaign, https://assets2.hrc.org/files/assets/resources/HRC- 
YouthFosterCare-IssueBrief-FINAL.pdf. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Homelessness & Housing, YOUTH.GOV, https://youth.gov/ 
youth-topics/lgbtq-youth/homelessness (last visited Aug 3, 2020). 
Twenty to forty percent of homeless youth identify as LGBT. Id. 
Two of the top four causes for homelessness among LGBT youth 
include: (1) family rejection of their sexual orientation or gender 
identity; and (2) aging out of the foster care system. Id. at 5. One 
study found that 65 percent of homeless LGBT youth had lived in 
congregate care or foster homes, and 39 percent of those youth 
were forced to leave because of their sexual orientation or gender 
identity. Child Welfare, supra note 15. 
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negative experiences are only exacerbated for LGBT 
youth of color.42 The disproportionate number of LGBT 
youth in foster care highlights the need to increase the 
pool of foster parents available to provide an affirming, 
supportive, familial placement setting. 
 Further, when discrimination against same-sex 
couples occurs in the context of the public child welfare 
system—a government program—it sends a message 
that stigmatizes and humiliates LGBT foster chil-
dren.43 
 In United States v. Windsor, in striking down the 
Defense of Marriage Act, this Court raised its concern 
for how the “differentiation” between different-sex and 
same-sex families humiliates children being raised by 
same-sex couples.44 This concern should undoubtedly 
extend to LGBT youth. It would certainly be incongru-
ous to recognize the pain of discrimination to children 
of LGBT parents and not to LGBT children them-
selves.45 
 
 42 See Kerith J. Conron & Bianca D.M. Wilson, supra note 
34. 
 43 United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 771–75 (2013) 
(DOMA “humiliates tens of thousands of children now being 
raised by same-sex couples”); see also Angela Onwuachi-Willig & 
Jacob Willig-Onwuachi, A House Divided: The Invisibility of the 
Multiracial Family, 44 Harv. C.R.-C.L. 231 (2009) (documenting 
similar harms to children in multiracial families). 
 44 Windsor, 570 U.S. at 772. 
 45 See generally Kyle C. Velte, Obergefell’s Expressive Prom-
ise, 6 HLRE 157 (2015) (illustrating how the Court’s LGBT-rights  
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 Allowing sexual orientation and gender identity 
discrimination in the provision of government foster 
care services would exacerbate the psychic trauma 
that many LGBT foster children already carry with 
them. A significant percentage of these young people 
are forced from their homes because their families re-
ject their sexual orientation or gender identity, often 
on religious grounds.46 To require governments to en-
shrine into law the hurtful personal beliefs LGBT 
youth seek to escape or are forced to flee is diametri-
cally opposed to public child welfare aims. 
 Allowing an exclusion of LGBT foster parents also 
sends a negative message about who these young peo-
ple are now, as LGBT youth, and who they will be as 
adults. LGBT youth should be free to experience teen 
crushes and first love without government-endorsed 
messages that tell them that they and their relation-
ships are illegitimate. It also sends a harmful message 
to LGBT youth who hope to one day become parents 
and foster parents themselves. 
 LGBT youth have reported that placement with 
accepting foster parents is a factor contributing to 
their empowerment and positive future outcomes.47 
Ensuring a robust pool of foster parents—including 
 
opinions send an important and transformative message about 
the place of LGBT Americans in society). 
 46 ANNIE E. CASEY FOUNDATION, LGBTQ IN CHILD WELFARE: 
A SYSTEMATIC REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 3 (2016), https://www. 
aecf.org/m/resourcedoc/aecf-LGBTQ2inChildWelfare-2016.pdf  
[hereinafter CASEY FOUNDATION REVIEW]. 
 47 Id. at 35. 
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LGBT foster parents—to LGBT youth, will maximize 
the number of placements that can mitigate the psy-
chological and emotional harm these children suffer.48 
 Permitting a government contractor to violate the 
City of Philadelphia’s non-discrimination requirement 
would harm all children in foster care and frustrate 
child welfare goals. Notably, the coronavirus is making 
it even more difficult to find foster homes for chil-
dren.49The harmful impact of the rule CSS seeks would 
exacerbate the challenge of finding foster homes in the 
midst of a global, deadly pandemic, particularly for 
“special needs” and LGBT youth. To ignore this reality, 
in deference to an impermissible, discriminatory, per-
sonal belief against the families more likely to foster 
the most vulnerable children, would violate children’s 
rights and interests, and constitute an unconscionable 
act of cruelty. 
 
 48 Id. 
 49 “Prior to COVID-19, no communities in the country could 
say they had more than enough foster families. . . . When you 
layer COVID-19 on top of that, the crisis becomes just that much 
more challenging.” Gracie Bonds Staples, Why Surge in Foster 
Care Placement Will Follow COVID-19 Pandemic, ATLANTA JOURNAL- 
CONSTITUTION (April 7, 2020), https://www.ajc.com/lifestyles/ 
why-surge-foster-care-placement-will-follow-covid-pandemic/ 
NKtnijOQwZpfsL8XypJsrL//. “As a result, the number of foster 
homes, already all too scarce in Washington before the crisis hit, 
will remain static for the state’s over 10,000 foster care children 
until the pandemic subsides. . . .” David Dodge, How Coronavirus 
Is Affecting Surrogacy, Foster Care and Adoption, N.Y. TIMES 




II. Allowing the Exclusion of Same-Sex Cou-
ples Gives Impermissible Legal Effect to Re-
ligious Beliefs at the Expense of Children in 
Contravention of Fourteenth Amendment 
Values 
 Here, the requested exemption is not simply a pri-
vate belief with no import or meaning; it is one that 
gives legal effect to unconstitutionally impermissible 
forms of discrimination. This Court has addressed this 
issue in a number of contexts, including LGBT cases. 
These decisions raise concerns about government prac-
tices that endorse or sanction Fourteenth Amendment 
offending personal or private beliefs by giving them ef-
fect in the law. 
 In the seminal case Palmore v. Sidoti,50 this Court 
took the unusual step of reviewing, and striking down, 
a state family court’s custody order. Following the di-
vorce of a white couple, the mother was awarded cus-
tody of the couple’s young child.51 Within months of the 
divorce, the father sought custody of the child based on 
changed conditions: the mother’s relationship with and 
marriage to a Black man.52 
 Despite finding no concern with either the 
mother’s or the stepfather’s parental fitness, the family 
court heeded a court counselor’s recommendation 
about the “social consequences” for a child being raised 
 
 50 466 U.S. 429 (1984). 
 51 Id. at 430. 
 52 Id. 
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in “an interracial marriage.”53 Specifically, the counse-
lor opined: “[T]he wife . . . has chosen for herself and 
for her child, a life-style unacceptable to the father and 
to society. . . . The child . . . is, or at school age will be, 
subject to environmental pressures not of choice.”54 
 While the father’s disapproval of the relationship 
was an insufficient basis for awarding him custody, the 
judge found that placement with the father was in the 
child’s best interest, so that she did not “suffer from . . . 
social stigmatization” in a society that did not fully ac-
cept interracial relationships.55 
 This Court reversed because of the actual function 
of the lower court’s reliance on a segment of society’s 
views of interracial relationships.56 This Court ex-
plained that, although “the Constitution cannot con-
trol such prejudices [ ] neither can it tolerate them. 
Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but 
the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them ef-
fect.”57 This Court’s ruling in Palmore recognized the 
eradication of racial discrimination by the State as a 
core purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment and made 
clear that the law must not give credence to those 
views in contravention of the Amendment’s objectives. 
 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. at 431 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. at 432 (“This raises important federal concerns arising 
from the Constitution’s commitment to eradicating discrimina-
tion based on race.”). 
 57 Id. at 433. 
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 Some people may view Palmore as a product of so-
cial views, not religious ones, yet it was decided a mere 
twenty years after Loving v. Virginia.58 This Court in 
Loving explicitly acknowledged the religious origins of 
anti-miscegenation laws and held that they were out-
weighed by the constitutional gravitas of the Four-
teenth Amendment right to marry.59 The salient point 
is not the origin of the personal belief, it is that once 
that belief has been deemed offensive to Fourteenth 
Amendment values, the government may not give it le-
gal effect. 
 We saw a similar concern raised in Obergefell, in 
which this Court explained: 
Many who deem same-sex marriage to be 
wrong reach that conclusion based on decent 
and honorable religious or philosophical 
premises. . . . But when that sincere, personal 
opposition becomes enacted law and public 
policy, the necessary consequence is to put the 
 
 58 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 59 Id. at 12. See also id. at 3 (noting that the trial court judge 
had highlighted the religious underpinnings of the State of Vir-
ginia’s anti-miscegenation law by “stating in an opinion that: ‘Al-
mighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and red, 
and he placed them on separate continents. And but for the inter-
ference with his arrangement there would be no cause for such 
marriages. The fact that he separated the races shows that he did 
not intend for the races to mix.’ ”). See generally Kyle C. Velte, 
Recovering the Race Analogy in LGBTQ Religious Exemption 
Cases 42 CARDOZO L. REV ___ (forthcoming 2020) 
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imprimatur of the States itself on an exclu-
sion[.]60 
 Here, allowing a government contractor to dis-
criminate in the administration of public foster care 
services because they believe marriage must only be 
between a man and a woman would give legal effect to 
private biases, or even personal beliefs, in violation of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. This Court has drawn 
“upon principles of liberty and equality to define and 
protect the rights of gays and lesbians,” and their fam-
ilies.61 And it should do so here to protect same-sex cou-
ples, and the focus of this brief—children in foster care. 
 First, affording a government contractor a reli-
gious exemption would legally endorse private views 
based on gender stereotypes about parenting. Second, 
it would give legal effect to impermissible sex discrim-
ination in violation of the equal protection guarantee—
a conclusion that should be all but a fait accompli after 
this Court’s recent decision in Bostock v. Clayton 
County.62 Third, it would give legal effect to a private 
 
 60 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602. 
 61 Id. at 2604; see also Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
 62 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020). See Erwin Chemerinsky, Chemer-
insky: Gorsuch Wrote His “Most Important Opinion” in SCOTUS 
Ruling Protecting LGBTQ Workers, ABA JOURNAL (July 1, 2020), 
https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/chemerinsky-justice- 
gorsuch-just-wrote-his-most-important-opinion (“It is possible 
that the court will say Bostock was just about interpreting the 
language of Title VII, and that it is different under equal protec-
tion. But there seems to be little basis for such a distinction once 
the court held that a prohibition against sex discrimination in-
cludes outlawing discrimination based on sexual orientation and 
gender identity.”); Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1783 (Alito, J.,  
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bias against same-sex couples, placing the State’s “im-
primatur . . . on [the] exclusion.”63 
 
A. Allowing the Exclusion Gives Imper-
missible Legal Effect to Stereotyping 
 Granting a religious exemption to discriminate 
against same-sex foster parents gives effect to personal 
beliefs based on stereotypes about appropriate gender 
roles in parenting. It is well-established that laws may 
not rely on overbroad generalizations about the differ-
ent talents, capacities, or preferences of men and 
women.64 Assumptions about expected parenting roles 
that men and women must or should perform based on 
gender alone fall squarely within the gender stereotyp-
ing that has been deemed impermissible in equal pro-
tection law.65 
 
dissenting) (“Under our precedents, the Equal Protection Clause 
prohibits sex-based discrimination unless a ‘heightened’ standard 
of review is met. By equating discrimination because of sexual 
orientation or gender identity with discrimination because of sex, 
the Court’s decision will be cited as a ground for subjection of all 
three forms of discrimination to the same exacting standard of 
review.”). 
 63 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602. 
 64 See Nevada Dept. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 
731 (2003) (recognizing “pervasive sex-role stereotype that caring 
for family members is women’s work” as an insufficient justifica-
tion under Equal Protection Clause); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 
279–80 (1979) (holding invalid justification based on state’s pref-
erence for allocation of family responsibilities under which wife 
plays a dependent role). 
 65 See Catherine E. Smith, Equal Protection for Children of 
Gay and Lesbian Parents: Challenging the Three Pillars of  
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 For example, in Caban v. Mohammed,66 the Court 
struck down a New York law that permitted unwed 
mothers to block the adoption of their children by 
denying consent to potential adoptees but did not 
grant this consent-based objection to unwed fathers. A 
father challenged this gender-based distinction as an 
equal protection violation.67 The mother argued that 
the distinction between unwed mothers and unwed fa-
thers was based on a fundamental difference between 
the sexes because “a natural mother, absent special cir-
cumstances, bears a closer relationship with her child” 
than a father.68 This Court disagreed, finding that “ma-
ternal and paternal roles are not invariably different 
in importance,” and that even if unwed mothers were 
closer to their newborn children, “this generalization 
concerning parent-child relations would become less 
acceptable as the age of the child increased.”69 This 
Court “reject[ed] . . . the claim that the broad, gender-
based distinctions of [the statute] is required by any 
universal difference between maternal and paternal 
relations at every phase of a child’s development.”70 
 
Exclusion—Legitimacy, Dual-Gender Parenting, and Biology, 28 
LAW & INEQ. 307, 326 (2010); see also Carlos A. Ball, Lesbian and 
Gay Families: Gender Nonconformity and the Implications of Dif-
ference, 31 CAP. U. L. REV. 691, 725–48 (2003). 
 66 441 U.S. 380 (1979). 
 67 Id. at 385. 
 68 Id. at 388. 
 69 Id. at 389. 
 70 Id. 
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 In J.E.B. v. Alabama,71 a prosecutor used nine of 
ten peremptory strikes to remove male jurors in a pa-
ternity and child support trial. The prosecutor de-
fended his actions “based upon the perception, 
supported by history, that men might be more sympa-
thetic to the arguments of a man alleged to be the fa-
ther of an out-of-wedlock child, while women might be 
more sympathetic and receptive to the. . . . [mother].”72 
Concerned about gender stereotypes being given im-
permissible legal effect, this Court rejected the prose-
cutor’s justification, explaining that “[w]hen state 
actors exercise peremptory challenges in reliance on 
gender stereotypes, they ratify and reinforce prejudi-
cial views of the relative abilities of men and women.”73 
 Here, CSS’ belief that marriage or child rearing 
can only be performed by a man and a woman invokes 
age-old stereotypes about the proper roles for men and 
women.74 Many can sincerely hold this belief on per-
sonal moral, philosophical, or religious grounds; this 
private view about gender fitness cannot, however, be 
operationalized through law into the administration of 
public foster care without running afoul of equal pro-
tection jurisprudence. Palmore teaches that “the Con-
stitution cannot control such prejudices but neither 
 
 71 511 U.S. 127 (1994). 
 72 Id. at 137. 
 73 Id. at 140. 
 74 Anthony Michael Kreis, Policing the Painted and the Pow-
dered, 41 CARDOZA LAW REVIEW 399 (2019) (exploring LGBT dis-
crimination’s relationship to gender stereotyping and sexism). 
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can it tolerate them.”75 They must not “directly or indi-
rectly” be given legal effect.76 
 To give them effect not only tramples on Four-
teenth Amendment prohibitions, it also contravenes 
the best interests of the child standard, which requires 
an individualized assessment of the needs of a child 
and of the parental competencies of each prospective 
parent.77 Gender-based exclusion of same-sex couples 
based on categorical and discriminatory beliefs about 
their parental fitness does violence to equal protection 
values this Court has established in Palmore, Caban, 
and J.E.B., and is contrary to foster children’s best in-
terests. 
 
B. Allowing the Exclusion Gives Imper-
missible Legal Effect to Sex Discrimi-
nation 
 Granting a government contractor a religious ex-
emption to discriminate against same-sex foster par-
ents would give the government’s imprimatur to 
impermissible sex classifications, which this Court has 
long held carry a “strong presumption” of “invalid[ity]” 
 
 75 Palmore, 466 U.S. at 433. 
 76 Id.; see generally Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (“[T]he fact 
that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a 
particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for up-
holding a law prohibiting the practice; neither history nor tradi-
tion could save a law prohibiting miscegenation from 
constitutional attack.”) (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 
186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)). 
 77 Washington, supra note 14, at 18. 
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under the Equal Protection guarantee.78 Since the 
1970s, LGBT advocates have consistently argued that 
LGBT discrimination is sex discrimination.79 
 This Court’s recent pronouncement in Bostock 
that it is impossible to discriminate against LGBT peo-
ple without engaging in sex discrimination should ap-
ply with equal or greater force to equal protection 
law.80 
 In Bostock, this Court held: 
An employer who fires an individual for being 
homosexual or transgender fires that person 
for traits or actions it would not have ques-
tioned in members of a different sex. Sex plays 
a necessary and undisguisable role in the de-
cision, exactly what Title VII forbids.81 
 Title VII prohibits employment discrimination 
that occurs “because of . . . sex.”82 According to this 
Court, the ordinary meaning of the word “‘sex’ signified 
. . . biological distinctions between male and female.”83 
Further, it clarified that “because of ” means but-for 
causation, which is not the same as a sole cause.84 “So 
long as the plaintiff ’s sex was one but-for cause [of the 
 
 78 J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 152 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 79 Nan D. Hunter, The Sex Discrimination Argument in Gay 
Rights Cases, 9 J.L. & POL’Y 397, 413 (2000). 
 80 Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1737. 
 81 Id. 
 82 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2020). 
 83 Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1739. 
 84 Id. 
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challenged employment] decision, that is enough to 
trigger the law.”85 
 Justice Gorsuch then applied the entire phrase 
“because of an individual’s . . . sex” to the LGBT plain-
tiffs and concluded that it was impossible to discrimi-
nate against LGBT people without taking their “sex” 
into consideration. With regard to sexual orientation, 
he explained: “If the employer fires the male employee 
for no reason other than the fact that he is attracted to 
men, the employer discriminates against him for traits 
or actions it tolerates in his female colleagues.”86 Simi-
larly, for transgender employees, he reasoned: “If the 
employer retains an otherwise identical employee who 
was identified as female at birth, the employer inten-
tionally penalizes a person identified as male at birth 
for traits or actions that it tolerates in an employee 
identified as female at birth.”87 In both of these in-
stances, “but-for” the employee’s sex, the individual 
would not have been subjected to termination.88 In 
short, as this Court concluded, it is not possible to 
 
 85 Id. (emphasis added); see also id. (“Often, events have mul-
tiple but-for causes. . . . [A Title VII] defendant cannot avoid lia-
bility just by citing some other factor that contributed to its 
challenged employment decision.” (emphasis in original)). 
 86 Id. at 1741. 
 87 Id. 
 88 “For an employer to discriminate against employees for be-
ing homosexual or transgender, the employer must intentionally 
discriminate against individual men and women in part because 
of sex. That has always been prohibited by Title VII’s plain 
terms—and that ‘should be the end of the analysis.’” Id. at 1743 
(internal citation omitted). 
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discriminate against an LGBT individual without en-
gaging in sex discrimination.89 
 Here, CSS seeks to offer its services only to differ-
ent-sex married couples based on the religious belief 
that marriage is between only a man and a woman. 
Rejecting an otherwise qualified same-sex foster cou-
ple constitutes sex discrimination because if one mem-
ber of the same-sex couple were a different sex, CSS 
would offer them certificatoin. In other words, CSS is 
discriminating against the couple because of sex. Their 
exclusion from the pool of available parents therefore 
constitutes sex discrimination. 
 
C. Allowing the Exclusion Gives Imper-
missible Legal Effect to Sexual Orien-
tation Discrimination 
 Permitting a categorical religious exemption in 
this context would give impermissible legal effect to 
CSS’ personal beliefs about same-sex marriage and 
same-sex families.90 This Court has expressly con-
firmed that “many same-sex couples provide loving 
and nurturing homes to children, whether biological or 
adopted . . . and many adopted and foster children 
 
 89 Id. at 1741 (“[I]t is impossible to discriminate against a 
person for being homosexual or transgender without discriminat-
ing against that individual based on sex.”). 
 90 Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 470 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he 
fear that an established institution will be undermined due to pri-
vate opposition to its inclusive shift is not a legitimate basis for 
retaining the status quo.”). Nor is it grounds for changing it. 
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have same-sex parents.”91 It has also struck down state 
laws, including those supported by sincerely held 
moral and religious beliefs, that single out or exclude 
LGBT people from the Fourteenth Amendment’s stric-
tures.92 And, because CSS is a government contractor, 
if it is granted a religious exemption from the City’s 
contractual non-discrimination law, that puts “the im-
primatur of the State itself ” on CSS’ exclusion of same-
sex couples.93 
 In Lawrence v. Texas,94 this Court struck down 
Texas’ sodomy statute as an unconstitutional violation 
of the Due Process rights of gays and lesbians, revers-
ing Bowers v. Hardwick.95 The State’s justification for 
criminalizing sodomy was that society had long con-
demned homosexual conduct as immoral. This Court 
explained that simply having a deeply held moral or 
religious conviction does not answer whether an exclu-
sion is constitutionally sound.96 “The issue is whether 
the majority may use the power of the State to enforce 
these views on the whole of society through operation of 
 
 91 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600. 
 92 Romer, 517 U.S. at 635 (“A State cannot so deem a class of 
persons a stranger to its laws.”). 
 93 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602. 
 94 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 95 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S. 558 (2003). 
 96 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571. 
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criminal law.”97 This Court’s answer: the majority may 
not.98 
 This Court’s ruling in Obergefell left no doubt that 
children and their rights and interests are paramount 
considerations in familial contexts. This Court ex-
pressed concerns about marriage bans economic and 
psychological injury to children of same-sex couples, 
and the interference with the “integrity . . . of their 
own famil[ies].”99 
 In this case, allowing a government contractor to 
refuse to certify same-sex couples as foster parents 
based on the belief that marriage is between a man 
and a woman would force the state to place its impri-
matur on the exemption. The consequence of this ex-
clusion harms LGBT people.100 And, amici contend that 
 
 97 Id. (emphasis added); see also id. at 577–78 (“[T]he fact 
that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a 
particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for up-
holding a law prohibiting the practice; neither history nor tradi-
tion could save a law prohibiting miscegenation from 
constitutional attack.” (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. at 216 (Stevens, 
J., dissenting))); Bowers, 478 U.S. at 212 (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing) (“A State can no more punish private behavior because of re-
ligious intolerance than it can punish such behavior because of 
racial animus. ‘The Constitution cannot control such prejudices 
but neither can it tolerate them. Private biases may be outside 
the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly give 
them effect.’” (quoting Palmore, 466 U.S. at 433)). 
 98 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
 99 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600. 
 100 See Susannah W. Pollvogt, Unconstitutional Animus, 81 
FORDHAM L. REV. 887, 926 (2012) (discussing the Equal Protec-
tion Clause’s goal to eliminate laws that create social castes). 
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such exclusions also harm children in foster care 
awaiting families. 
 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center101 pro-
vides another instructive example of the dangers of al-
lowing private beliefs to take root in law. In Cleburne, 
this Court struck down a zoning ordinance requiring 
permits for group homes for individuals with cognitive 
disabilities, in part, due to the City Council’s reliance 
on property owners’ stereotypes.102 This Court was 
clear: 
The City may not avoid the strictures of the 
[Equal Protection] Clause by deferring to the 
wishes or objections of some fraction of the 
body politic.103 
 Here, the City of Philadelphia opposes such defer-
ence, yet respondents, a government contractor, seek a 
religious exemption to directly give impermissible le-
gal effect to their personal beliefs about the admin-
istration of public foster care services. Some may view 
private beliefs about sexual orientation as not trigger-
ing heightened Fourteenth Amendment protections.104 
City of Cleburne, however, demonstrates that state ac-
tion that gives impermissible legal effect to private be-
liefs can fail even rational basis review.105 
 
 101 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
 102 Id. at 448. 
 103 Id. (citing Palmore, 466 U.S. at 433). 
 104 This conclusion is called in to question by this Court’s rul-
ing in Bostock. 
 105 City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 450. 
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 CSS invokes its sincerely held religious belief to 
discriminate against same-sex couples. However, the 
freedom to express or exercise one’s religion is not ab-
solute. Giving impermissible legal effect to a govern-
ment contractor’s personal beliefs in contravention of 
Fourteenth Amendment protections, whatever their 
source or rationale, undermines children’s rights and 
interests and contravenes the City’s duty to provide 
them with the most advantageous, familial placement 
setting. 
--------------------------------- ♦ --------------------------------- 
 
CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the 
court of appeals should be affirmed. 
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